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Sailing into the Wind: new disciplines in Australian higher
education
TREVOR GALE & SIMON KITTO, Monash University, Australia
ABSTRACT Much is made of the potential of lifelong learning for individuals and organisations. In this
article we tend to make much less of it, certainly with respect to its use in universities to discipline
academics. Nevertheless, we argue that academics now need to re-learn the positions they occupy and the
stances they take in response to the marketisation of Australian universities. In particular, we suggest that
the position of (pure) critique no longer commands attention in Australian contexts of higher education,
although the paper does not suggest a disregard for a critical stance purely for the sake of participation.
It is in understanding the interconnections between position and stance, and how they might be
strategically performed during the everyday practices of academics, that a more promising way of engaging
with the venalities of the market is envisaged; a strategy that could be described as ‘sailing into the wind’.
In discussing these matters, the paper draws on semi-structured interviews with academics located in
university faculties/departments/schools of education along Australia’s eastern seaboard.
Introduction
Lifelong learning has the potential to increase both equity and liberty in work environ-
ments, provided it is taken seriously and supported by:
… ambitious institutional intervention, much more flexible relations between
work and education, a move towards ‘learning organizations’ (Zuboff 1989),
more optimistic definitions of educability and curriculum, a vast development
of community schooling, and more bounteous educational budgets. (Brown et
al., 1997, p. 33)
Short of such commitments, the current championing of lifelong learning appears as little
more than New Right assertions of ‘the principles of market competition within every
nook and cranny of contemporary life’ (Brown et al., 1997, p. 6). The argument here is
that post-Fordist societies have embraced a significant redefinition of skill (Block, 1990)
within contexts of employment, such that particular personal and social qualities are
elevated by employers to similar levels of importance as technical knowledge and, at the
same time, are re-worked to serve more corporate interests. Given this analysis, some
ISSN 0142–5692 (print)/ISSN 1465-3346 (online)/03/040501–14  2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd
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‘learning’ organisations can be seen as increasingly concerned with the personal lives of
their workers and with corresponding levels of surveillance and disciplining ‘where every
aspect of peoples’ lives comes under the formal gaze of “authority” ’ (Brown et al., 1997,
p. 12). Learning these new skills becomes a lifelong process or life project for workers as
they attempt to conform (through their up-skilling and re-skilling) to the changing needs
of their employers.
As one example of these processes at work, this article focuses on the working lives of
Australian academics in faculties, departments and schools of education. In doing so, it
reports aspects of research on competition policy in Australian higher education, drawing
on semi-structured interviews with education academics located within universities along
Australia’s eastern seaboard. Throughout, interviewees are referenced according to: (1)
their formal and general positions, as Deans (D), Associate Deans (AD), Heads of Schools
(HS), Course Coordinators (C) and Academics (A); (2) an assigned number, to distinguish
between those similarly positioned; and (3) their institution type, whether traditional (i.e.
long-standing) (T), 1960s/1970s (S) or more recent (R) universities (thus D3/S, HS2/T,
A5/R, etc.). As utilised here, the interview data should be seen as developing the
arguments of the paper more than strictly representative of that data. We have chosen
to include certain interviews because they illustrate ways in which academic work is
being re-positioned within some sectors of Australian higher education, and the ways and
extent to which academics are involved in this re-positioning. We also see these
arguments as having potential salience in higher education institutions and systems
beyond Australia, particularly those influenced by capitalist markets and neo-liberalism.
We begin by stating the obvious: that being an academic is not what it used to be;
specifically, that many academics believe they have been manoeuvred out of position by
university managers who are informed by a market disposition. We then illustrate the
surveillance and examination utilised by some to secure and maintain these new
positions; the dark side of lifelong learning (Tight, 1998; Rose, 1999). Data for this
section is focused on the institutional regulation of academics’ e-mail. While other data
from our study could have been utilised, space and the salience of these examples to our
discussion influenced their inclusion. Finally, we argue the need for academics to engage
with the new game in higher education, not to increase or conserve the market’s
influence within universities but to play in such a way as to ‘transform, partially or
completely, the immanent rules of the game’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 99). In
short, we suggest that academics need to understand that equity and liberty are never
secured for all time but require their lifelong engagement, even within their own walls
and certainly in collaboration with their broader communities.
This discussion is preceded by an account of our utilisation of the theoretical resources
of Bourdieu and Foucault. In this we are informed, in part, by the counsel of Ball (1990,
1994), who reasons that two theories are potentially better than one in exploring complex
social issues, but also by what we see as particular interests and understandings that these
social theorists share.
Bourdieu and Foucault
In proposing a new positioning of academics, in this article we draw on the work of
Bourdieu (1997), his notions of cultural capital, field positions and stances, and his
analogy of social relations as a game. According to Bourdieu, cultural capital represents
an individual’s stored or accumulated ‘wealth of knowledge’, which can be drawn upon
to produce more of this wealth; that is, knowledge of the world and how to engage with
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it. Not only do particular forms of capital tend to be specific to particular fields, but the
capital valued within fields can also change. That is, the dominance of specific capitals
in specific fields is related to issues of time and place; it is dynamic. Bourdieu suggests
further that the influence of capital can be seen in one’s (formal and informal) positioning
within the field and the relations between these positions. Differently positioned, some
can afford to adopt some stances over others but there is still a sense in which mobilising
a particular stance involves a strategic move in a game. The critique offered here is that
the game or field of Australian higher education has changed such that the capital or
tokens of traditionally positioned academics have been de-valued, and thus their
positions, rendering some stances less powerful and possible. Re-positioned, the challenge
is to play in a way that re-values the best of academic capital.
In utilising Bourdieu’s work, we are also cognisant of criticisms of his conceptualisation
of ‘habitus’—particularly how it is read by some as structuralist—which is portrayed as
emphasising constraint more than possibility so that individuals are trapped within the
‘prison-house’ of habitus. Of course this is not Bourdieu’s reading of his work, and nor
is it ours. Indeed, to adopt such an approach would severely restrict the analytical scope
of this article (and others like it), allowing for the description of the interpellation of the
position of academics under discourses of marketisation but not accounting for the
possibility of individual practices of resistance based in strategic intention. As a way of
opening up this debate—rather than as a mechanism for moving beyond Bourdieu—we
utilise Foucault’s (1977, 1980) notions of surveillance and disciplinary power, which also
allow for an examination of the practices of academics within higher education
institutions as not necessarily subjected to the dictates of neo-liberal versions of lifelong
learning. While mindful of the power of constraints, we also seek to illustrate that these
are developed and maintained by social practices; they are not set for all time and they
are not beyond the reach of intervention and change.
Critique of Foucault’s account of disciplinary power has some similarities with that of
habitus (see earlier). For example, commenting on Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1977),
de Certeau (1984) argues that while Foucault’s analysis of discipline focused on the
‘microphysics of power’, he approached this from the perspective of the producers of
discipline, not from how these discipline regimes could be challenged and/or changed.
However, in our view Foucault’s conception of power is inclusive of resistance but is
understood in relation to disciplinary power. As Foucault explains, there are no ‘relations
of power without resistance; the latter are all the more real and effective because they
are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised’ (1980, p. 142).
Conceiving of the relations of power in this way allows for the possibility for academics
to engage in multiple subject positions by virtue of the flow of disciplinary power, which
constitutes discursive spaces that allow critical stances to be acted upon. As Foucault
notes:
It would not be possible for power relations to exist without points of
insubordination which, by definition, are means of escape. Accordingly, every
intensification, every extension of power relations to make the insubordinate
submit can only result in the limits of power. (Foucault, 1982, p. 225)
Along with others (Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose, 1999), we argue similarly that the
precarious nature of governing and disciplinary mechanisms aids in producing and
facilitating practices of resistance. The maintenance of panoptic disciplinary apparatuses
is an ongoing activity, and surveillance mechanisms are prone to failure. This adds
further to the possibility of academics utilising opportunities within workplace surveil-
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lance mechanisms in a tactical manner to mobilise their academic capital for the
purposes of individual and collegial empowerment. That is, a tactical habitus—to extra-
polate from Bourdieu—positions the academic to ‘vigilantly make use of cracks that
particular conjunctions open in the surveillance of proprietary powers. It poaches them.
It creates surprises in them’ (de Certeau, 1984, p. 37).
We are aware that some regard Bourdieu and Foucault as strange epistemological
bedfellows. However, as implied earlier, we are of the view that both were concerned to
straddle the structuralist/poststructuralist divide, to see these theoretical constructs as
dialectically related rather than as dichotomies, to theorise in ways that recognise and
understand constraints imposed by others as well as the opportunities to challenge and/or
manipulate these constraints. We see this as critical work: to be able to hold epistemolog-
ical ‘certainties’ in tension, particularly in postmodern times, cognisant that their
separations tend to be theoretical more than empirical, constructed more than evident
in practice. For Bourdieu, ‘habitus’, in relation to field and capital, is the embodiment
of these commitments. Similarly, for Foucault, disciplinary power, which includes
resistance, is the focus of this work.
The paper examines these issues in three distinct but inter-related parts. The first
reviews the literature concerning the pervasiveness of neo-liberal rhetoric in Australian
higher education, and how this re-shapes the position and role of the academic in
university life. The second section outlines the mechanics of disciplinary power in terms
of how the practice of internal institutional critique by academics is not only constrained,
but also enabled. More specifically, an empirical example of the role of information and
communication technologies (ICTs)—the regulations around the use of e-mail—in this
process is presented. The third and final part of the paper also utilises empirical material
to demonstrate the salience of the different positions and active stances that academics
have taken. This section shows how the neo-liberal language within higher education can
be strategically mobilised at the level of the everyday practice of academics to resist the
very market agendas that neo-liberal discourse constitutes. In this way, we argue that
subversion from within, through the strategic use of neo-liberal discourse, is preferable
to external academic criticism that is more easily marginalised and/or dismissed.
Rethinking the Chessboard
In Tony Coady’s (2000) recent and somewhat controversial edited collection, Why
Universities Matter, Raimond Gaita (RMIT, Melbourne, and Kings College, London)
relates a story once told by Sir Zelman Cowan (former Vice-Chancellor of the University
of Queensland and former Governor-General of Australia). The story was of:
a visiting dignitary, a politician I think, who addressed the dons at Oxford as
employees of the university. One of them responded, ‘We are not employees
of the university. We are the university’. (Gaita, 2000, p. 44; original emphasis)
It is a similar story to a more recent one told by Frank Campbell while reviewing
Coady’s book:
About 1987, while a senior lecturer at what is now McDeakin [a pseudonym
for the marketised form of Deakin University, Australia], I received a letter
written by a minor university bureaucrat, a new kind of vice-chancellor’s
assistant. This letter ordered me in the name of the university to desist from
making public statements outside my specialist area. I replied that she was not
the university, I was. Further, the task of university administration was to serve
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academics and students who comprised the university. Not long after, this
censor received a title: professor. She had never taught anything. (Campbell,
2000, p. 14)
Signalled in these two anecdotes is a re-positioning of academics and a re-making of their
work in contemporary Australian higher education. In short, Australian universities are
no longer constituted by academics at large, although even at their ‘best’ (i.e. safe from
external threats on academic freedom), this ideal was never fully realised. In practice, the
ongoing conception of universities was confined to an elite group of academics, typically
professors, and then only remotely responsive to the broader communities they ‘served’.
Such arrangements have been largely displaced and rightly so. Yet they have been
replaced by relations of remarkably similar design, albeit governed by different interests
with different intentions but still ‘from within university administration’ (Martin, in
Cervini, 1999, p. 1). Molony describes the new positioning thus:
As academics we are now employees; the politicians and their servants are our
employers and the purpose of the university is production. Production means
supplying a market. Management means directing production. Excellence
means producing goods the market will buy. (2000, p. 80)
Bourdieu’s (1992, pp. 98–99) analogy of a game to explain the regularities of social
relations is instructive here. In these terms, the higher education ‘game’ might still be
engaged by similar players—for example, in most cases, vice-chancellors (university
presidents) are former academics (Aitkin, 2000)—but the relative value of one’s cards
within the game, the valuing of different species of capital (economic, social, cultural,
symbolic) has changed, and with it the regularities of the game. In particular, academics’
trump card, ‘academic freedom’, has been usurped by ‘market competition’. Until
recently, the second of these was a card with more force and legitimacy in games played
outside public domains but social games and their rules are not static. Despite this
de-valuing of their traditional positioning, academics’ investments in the game remain
high. As McInnis (2000) notes, 40% of Australian academics are currently working more
than 50 hours per week. At the same time, their belief in the game has been subjected
to increasing self-examination. For example, in the past 5 years, job satisfaction among
Australian academics has fallen from 67% to 51% (McInnis, 2000).
In short, there is considerable belief in the virtues of a previous game—even some
academics who still regard it as the main game—to the extent that they attempt to play
two games, so to speak: the old and the new. For many, it is difficult to accept that ‘they
are being asked to become business managers and rethink the chessboard rather than
being given the space to finish the biography of whoever’ (A2/T); to continue their
working life under a former definition of academic work. Many of these academics are
sceptical of the benefits of a market disposition. In this they have been compared with
NASA engineers whose concerns for efficiency and safety stalled the launch (and
subsequent demise) of the Challenger spacecraft in the 1980s. In that case:
Senior administrators in the organisation prevailed upon the engineers to think
again. Their crucial piece of advice: ‘Think like a manager, not like an
engineer’. Unfortunately, it was taken, with the awful results that eventuated
(Davis, 1991, pp. 150–156). What is so chilling about the advice, and what
contributed so much to the dreadful outcome, is the stark opposition between
managing and engineering, an opposition that treats management as a practice
independent of what is being managed. (Coady, 2000, p. 16)
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Today’s university manager thinks about the market and the image of the university
conveyed within that market. It is difficult work: ‘the image this year may not be the
same image next year so you keep having to dance around the market, trying to get the
edge all the time’ (A3/S). It is also different work:
Before, academics would leave an academic position and go into university
management of some kind; you could become a Pro-Vice Chancellor or
something. And I always argued that at least they knew what goes on in the
classroom. Whereas I think this new group don’t know what goes on in the
contemporary university classroom because their eyes are set outside the
university. They’ll talk about good teaching in some of the universities, because
that’s the flavour of the month these days, but I think that their visions and
fantasies are somewhere else out there, either trying to predict or anticipate
niche markets or some way in which to get an advantage over the competition.
(A3/S)
For academics to think in this way, to accept academic work as their business—the noun
emphasised rather than the pronoun—requires some considerable re-learning.
Subject to Examination
The legitimacy of this logic now informing Australian higher education depends on the
claimed virtues of market competition and its attendant neo-liberal conceptions of
choice. But it takes little knowledge of and experiences with markets to realise that choice
and freedom within markets is illusionary or at best temporary:
There is no better example in this country than the two airlines policy. The
government sold Australian owned Qantas in order to provide greater compe-
tition. How droll. So every time a new player emerges on the [domestic airline]
market these two [Qantas and Ansett] are big enough to drive them out of
business and then they settle back into comfort again … Unfettered markets
seem to me to be things in which the strong rises to the top and then proceeds
to make the market anti-competitive. I think that’s the whole rationale of
unfettered capitalism and dare I say it, immoral capitalism. I mean, capitalism
without any sense of equity, social justice and social obligation and that’s what
we get, endlessly, in this current environment. (AD1/S)
The fact that since these comments were made Virgin Blue has entered the Australian
domestic airline market and Ansett has departed demonstrates that the players in any
one game are not static. Neither does this entry and exit diminish the argument about
the implicit intent of market competition: paradoxically, to eliminate competition by
establishing a monopoly (or duopoly) over other players within the market and, hence,
to maximise one’s (economic, social, cultural, symbolic) capital. In Australian higher
education, the current discourse advocating for two or three ‘world class’ universities
within the country, in order to compete on the world stage, reflects this same attempt by
some to monopolise positions of status and government funding in the domestic market.
This is the nature of market competition that now characterises many Australian
universities, including the working lives of academics. Under its influence, academics
must now learn their new positions and the new rules of the game. This sometimes calls
for their surveillance in order to (re)move and/or (re)train dissenters, thereby re-asserting
university managers’ dominance and the regularities of the market. As Foucault (1977,
p. 170) notes, ‘the success of disciplinary power derives … from the use of simple
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instruments; hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and their combination in
a procedure that is specific to it, the examination’. The Foucauldian concept of the
panopticon and the channelling of disciplinary power to normalise populations and to
instil self-regulatory practices within individuals has been well utilised in the social
sciences. What is new in the higher education arena is the changing nature of its material
and thus social manifestations. For example, the proliferation of ICTs to manage
information flows between managers, students and academics serves to create new
configurations of disciplinary and counter-disciplinary techniques. As Poster states, ‘the
quantitative advances in technologies of surveillance result in a qualitative change in the
microphysics of power (1990, p. 93).
Several examples of this new techno-focused flow of disciplinary power are evident in
Australian universities, although more extreme forms tend to appear at the extremities
(lower-status institutions) of the higher education system (Gale, 2000). Of these, a number
constrain academics’ contributions to public forums; contributions that are legitimated
when they reflect the thinking of university managers, and illegitimated when they do
not. The effect is to stifle academic debate while maintaining its image and its
authoritative power. Erica Cervini, for example, reports the suspension of one professor’s
e-mail account and the threat of being charged with defamation after publicly criticising
‘VUT’s [Victorian University of Technology’s] plan to buy corporate boxes at
[Melbourne’s] Colonial Stadium’ (1999, p. 4). Yet these same institutions ‘boast of the
achievements of their staff and students’ (Brett, 2000, p. 147) when they perceive these
to bring glory to the university and augment its balance sheet (Marginson, 2000).
Further examples of these disciplinary techniques at work are beginning to appear in
the literature (see, for example, Coady, 2000). To illustrate this disciplinary power, we
focus here on one specific arena: the surveillance and regulation of staff e-mail
discussions. Consider, for example, the panoptic disciplinary strategies in the form of
rules that now underwrite staff e-mail lists in one of Australia’s newer universities:
I belong to, I think they call it a ‘spoon collective’, which is an international
email list which sends out calls for papers, journals, that kind of thing. What
I did was to redirect a message I received to all the postgraduate students, or
anybody that I thought it might interest in our faculty. But I found that it
wasn’t going through, or it would go through the following day. I just put a
general address, the postgraduate students address for our faculty. I redirected
it and sent it off. And it was not coming through … I didn’t take any notice at
first. I thought it was my machine. That was the first thing. I thought ‘There’s
something wrong with my machine. I’ll fix it tomorrow’. When I came in the
next day, there it was—my email—[but] from the faculty secretary. And for a
moment I thought, she must be on the list, too. That was my first thought. And
if I remember correctly, I did nothing then, thinking, kind of justifying all these
things—‘She must be on the list, my machine doesn’t work’—something like
that, you know. The next one happened a few days later. I did the same thing,
and again it didn’t come through. And then I thought ‘Why is this?’ So I
rang the secretary to see why hers went through and mine didn’t. And she said
‘If you draw something from the email, outside the university, and redirect it,
it will come straight to me. I vet it and then I send it on if, in fact, it is right
to send it. I check with the Associate Dean [Research] whether this email is
right for the students to see’. There must be some sort of electronic checking
device.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 2
2:4
8 1
4 J
un
e 2
01
2 
508 T. Gale & S. Kitto
Somehow they must have some way of checking, which is a bit frightening, I
feel. (A1/R)
A prima facie analysis of these types of technologically mediated interactions would suggest
that the lecturers concerned had encountered a manifestation of a type of powerful
electronic panopticons that pervade modern society (Sewell & Wilkinson, 1992) and that
constitute a totalising negative form of disciplinary power. However, Foucault (1977) also
conceptualises techniques of discipline as being positive and productive in the sense that
it ‘makes individuals’ and creates possible ways of acting and being. The tendency, as in
Sewell & Wilkinson’s (1992) work, is to read Foucault’s disciplinary techniques as the
primary force that makes the subject, rather than as simply one element in a concat-
enation of practices through which subjectivity emerges (Ezzy, 1997). Such readings of
Foucault utilised in educational research have been criticised as a misappropriation of his
concepts by over-emphasising the efficacy of disciplinary power. These works serve to
represent the operation of power as constituting repressive relationships of domination
and silencing in pedagogical activities (Roth, 1992). However, what must be remembered
is that panoptic techniques of this sort, especially those constituted by ICTs, are the
context-contingent configurations of the panopticon as a concrete apparatus (Kitto,
2003). The panopticon as a concrete apparatus is an imperfect disciplinary technology
that requires continual modifications within the site in which it operates (Foucault, 1977).
Technologically mediated networks of discipline, like ‘government’, are in practice ‘a
congenitally failing operation’ (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 10). In addition, technologies like
ICTs both create ‘systems which close off other options and generate novel, unpredict-
able and indeed unthinkable, options’ (Callon, 1991, p. 132). In other words, cracks
appear in the socio-technical networks of surveillance that constitute disciplinary appara-
tuses that facilitate the flow of power, allowing the agency or ‘voice’ of the academic to
be heard.
In the earlier case the lecturer went on to say:
And then she [the faculty secretary] said, ‘But to tell you the truth, I’m sick of
doing this. What you do is you cut and paste it. Just cut it, paste it, and put
it in a new email and send it around.’ So I cut it off the spoon collective and
put it on one of my own email messages so it didn’t identify the list but it
identified me and I sent it around without any problems … (A1/R)
In this sense, all the points of articulation that bind together the necessary nodes within
ICT surveillance networks must be ‘disciplined’ (such as the secretary herself) no matter
how peripheral the node might be to the target object of disciplinary power (the
academic). This is essential in order for the effects of disciplinary power to play upon the
body, to act upon the actions of the academic. This, of course, requires some intensive
and ongoing maintenance to maintain the continuous operation of disciplinary tech-
niques. This account quite clearly demonstrates this principle and the subsequent
production of opportunities for resistance created via ICTs, such as e-mail.
Nevertheless, what is disturbing in this instance is the clear intent to regulate what this
academic and her colleagues circulate on e-mail lists that ‘belong’ to their employers.
Such regulation is directed at stifling public discussion and borders on intervening in
private correspondence (Marshall, 2000). Even though there are ways of circumventing
these regulations, decisions are still being made elsewhere as to the relevance and
desirability of e-mail content, based on criteria that can elude academics; a situation that
was made clear in a similar experience:
Usually if you type the address for the faculty or something like that it will just
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go around the faculty. But recently I sent around an email to warn people of
the theft in my room and it didn’t come through. And then I thought, ‘Well,
it’s been taken again’ … I asked around if people had got the email and they
said, ‘No, no-one has received the email’ but the email went somewhere
because it wasn’t sent [bounced] back to me. It was a correct address and it
had gone. So I can only assume it was vetted by someone who thought, ‘No,
this particular email is not in the interest of this faculty’. It was about
something stolen out of my room, so I can only assume [the rationale] was ‘We
don’t want that kind of thing on the email’. (A1/R)
Others have written about the reaction of management to academics’ views expressed via
e-mail concerning the university’s awarding of an honorary degree to the leader of a coup
d’etat (Danaher et al., 2000). Criticism of the award flowed freely on the staff e-mail list
and sparked considerable debate. In that case the regulation of academics occurred after
the event. Participants in the online discussion were summoned before chancellery (the
university president’s office) to hear ‘the other side of the story’ and were informed of the
need to maintain a particular corporate image. One wonders how these academics would
have fared given more explicit regulation (issued prior to the event) of the sort in the
following directive circulated via e-mail to university staff at a similar institution:
There have been a number of instances lately of staff using the e-mail address
which reaches all other staff on a campus … for inappropriate reasons or
communicating inappropriate messages … In future, whenever a member of
staff wishes to send an e-mail to all staff … they must obtain the agreement of
their line supervisor, in writing, in advance.
Again, such disciplinary networks are almost impossible to maintain logistically, particu-
larly if academics were to swamp their ‘line supervisors’ with requests en masse. However,
in practice, the prime objective of panoptic techniques is to direct the flow of disciplinary
power to the individual, to create the self-regulated body in line with the strategic intentions
of the institution. As Foucault observes:
A real subjection is born mechanically from a fictitious relation … He [sic] who
is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for
the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he
inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both
roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection. (1977, pp. 202–203)
In this sense, the e-mail circulated by management that attempted to limit the discursive
field of what can and cannot be said resulted in a tendency for the academics to
self-regulate. They thought twice about what they sent to e-mail lists, demonstrating their
compliance with by-lines such as ‘sent with the approval of my Head of School’. Many
such academics demonstrate that they have learnt the new rules; several, that they
understand the ‘new structures of power and control’ and ‘the fiction that workers and
management are on the same team’ (Sennett, 1998, p. 47). However, as previously
argued, the structure of disciplinary techniques that bring power to bear on the body are
precarious and we must be cautious not to overestimate the effectiveness of the
deployment of disciplinary techniques. Even Foucault has been criticised:
… highlight disciplinary practices at the expense of a consideration of the
various other practices that also constitute the social realm. Such practices
might include everyday activities of individuals who resist, in a mundane and
‘invisible’ fashion. As Michel de Certeau observes, beneath the ‘monotheistic’
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apparatuses of the panopticon, a ‘polytheism of scattered practices survives’.
(McNay, 1994, p. 102).
Playing the Game
There are a number of ways in which academics in our research (outlined earlier)
have responded to this disciplinary power and the institution of changed conditions,
responses broader than how these matters affect their use of e-mail. Some consent to
new rules, ceding to requirements to re-learn their vocation—which is now a compulsory
part of, and even a new form of, work (Tight, 1998, p. 262)—accepting their new
positioning in the higher education game and how it is now to be played. These are
matters of resignation for some while others see new opportunities for themselves and for
universities in a higher education marketplace.
In this section, however, we focus on academics who are less subservient and endeared
to the market, including those who are of the view that ‘you have to be a sycophant to
remain part of the group’ (C3/T). In particular, we consider the positions of critique and
of strategy adopted by academics, although we tend to emphasise the importance of
self-critique as a condition of informed strategy more than a separation of these positions.
As one interviewee described the distinction: ‘I want to do more than keep an eye on
them. I want to actually work from within [and] against’ (AD1/S). Following Bourdieu
(1992, p. 99), the argument here is that adopting a position of pure critique—a position
with considerable currency under the old rules—neither increases nor conserves one’s
capital in a changed game. What is required is for academics to get into the prevailing
game to transform it.
From a Position of Critique
For many academics who are critical of the influence of the market on higher education,
their criticisms are related to values and ideals. It is not simply a matter of pragmatics,
of disagreements over how to fund universities, for example. Rather, it is more
fundamentally about ‘the very idea of a university’ (Coady, 1996) and how that plays out
in the practicalities of academic life. The position of critique, however, has lost ground
in the current marketisation of higher education. Academic critique no longer holds
centre stage in universities, but has been re-cast as obstructionist and self-serving; the
volume and structure of its cultural capital de-valued. In short, there are other capitals
now more highly valued in the field of higher education, particularly with respect to its
management, and that influence its rules of interaction.
Some academics approach this changed environment by increasing the stakes—by
refusing to play the new game, for example—but they fail to realise that such a stance
relies on a former and different valuing of academics and their work. Even now:
I’m sure you can always find a group of people who will massage your ego and
tell you that you’re doing right by refusing to play the [new] game. But the
game in the end is going to be largely defined by people who can generate
resources and not by the people who want to hold purist positions. (A4/T)
In such circumstances, the effectiveness of this stance—to critique new (managerial)
arrangements in higher education from the outside—is questionable, even suicidal. By
refusing to play, academics, whose capital has been considerably de-valued, do little to
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valorise that capital and ultimately have little effect on how the new game is played. As
one critic of this stance noted:
After something like thirty years of trying to make changes in various ways in
the world, I think the unwillingness to participate is pretty much a way of
making sure that you have absolutely no consequence in what hap-
pens … Undoubtedly there will be people not playing but they won’t be heard
amongst the din. There’s just too much noise going to come out of people who
are in there fighting over the available space. (A5/S)
Not only do such academics sideline themselves and their causes—positioning them out
of sight and out of mind—they are also targeted by those who now hold the reins of
power. Those who continue to operate according to the old rules of engagement and
refuse to entertain their demise:
… are likely to play a much greater price than is fair by standing outside and
opposing … As soon as you disagree about anything you’re held to disagree
about all things and you’re cast out and it’s very much like that … This lot take
no prisoners and that also gives you cause for thought, too. Are you indeed
doing the right thing by standing out if you totally exclude yourself, then, from
any contribution to any form of any debate … Is this a wise move? (AD1/S)
Questioning the wisdom of ‘standing outside and opposing’ is not just a matter of
effectiveness. Indeed, some read such a stance as ‘an abdication of responsibility for the
outcomes’ (A5/S). Their reasoning is that one must not only be strategic, but also ‘do the
right thing’. It is this self-critique and morality that informs their approach and that
questions the desirability of a position of non-action:
That’s just too comfortable a position, it seems to me. It’s a position that
enables you to avoid responsibilities; it’s a position which enables you to avoid
recognition of a plurality of views. I actually don’t believe my views are right
all the time. I am prepared to believe the extreme things we live through at the
moment are wrong but I don’t accept that I understand all about it. So there
is some compromise for me in continuing to engage, which is forced upon me
in order to make any progress. (C3/T)
In short, taking a position of pure critique—a position of inflexibility with respect to what
constitutes a university and academic work—has severe consequences for academics
given a new set of playing conditions. Flexibility and compromise are pre-conditions of
this new academic work, although the intention here is not to disguise academics’
increasing insecurity in the workplace under the banner of flexibility, but to confront it.
From a Position of Strategy
The non-action position, however good the critique, does not serve the critical academic
very well. It is far more strategic to remain in the game. However, becoming part of the
action has its own critics:
People who say that I’ve sold out; I challenge them to show me how. One of
the things about politics is being strategic. If you’re not strategic, then you’re
not much help to many people; certainly not to the profession … if you’re not
in those positions, somebody else is going to be. (D1/T)
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Similarly:
I don’t belong in that school of critics. I think you’ve got to stay in there and
do what you can do … The people who I know are the most active still are
those who have a theory about what the world might look like outside this kind
of crazy niche marketing mentality, and try to operate within that … I find it
the best and worst of times. It’s the worst because there is a whole bunch of
suits running our business, but it’s exciting because they’ve offered us what
Stephen Ball has often called a ‘third space’. And it’s that third space I want
to get into. (A3/S)
What is illustrated in these comments is Bourdieu’s (1992, p. 105) distinction between
position and stance, a distinction that also recognises their interconnectedness. The
argument here is that it is possible, even imperative, for academics to adopt a position
situated within the new game of higher education while maintaining a critical stance. In
this ‘third’ space:
I worked in a program for something like five years in which there was highly
contested ground … There was another guy who believed as I did over [a
particular] issue … and in the end he resigned … But from his resignation I
learnt that a stone can sink without a ripple. His letter of resignation never
even made it to the table of the executive officer. And he disappeared without
a trace. And that’s the option people who wish to remain pure and take
principled positions have; to disappear without a trace. For four or five years
every day I kept my bum on the seat that a whole lot of other people wanted,
on the basis of displacement theory: while you’re in there, while you’re
occupying that bit of space, while people argue with these arguments, you’re
still a player. And in that sense, we can, by being successful purveyors of the
new postmodern education, be at the arenas where the debates are had and
still get up and have our say. (A4/T)
Clearly, not all positions command an audience. Opportunities to make contributions
that are heard are related to the positions from which they are spoken. In particular, the
position of pure critique (and of non-participation, non-action) has not proven to be a
commanding one in the current context of Australian higher education. But also at stake
is how critique from these positions is voiced. It is not strategic, for example, to adopt
‘the Wallace Greenslade [of Goon Show fame] position: “I hope you know that although
I read this stuff I certainly do not write it” ’ (C3/T). Furthermore, ‘I think it’s utterly
immoral to even think of not using their language’ (C3/T) in circumstances where others
are dependent on you. Argued here is that academics’ critique of the market needs to
be clothed in the language of the market, language that has currency in contemporary
Australian universities. This is quite a different thing from abandoning or watering down
such critique. As one interviewee reflected:
Two or three years ago I used to be very uncertain and very uncomfortable
with the idea of products. But I think it’s only by defining product in a very
narrow way that you have trouble with ‘product’. I mean, we talked about
production for a long time. Production is product. And our courses, let’s call
them programs. It’s just that the current jargon calls them products. And I
don’t actually hold any special significance to the term but market terminology
and some of the organisational administrative terminology seeps in whether
you like it or not. (D1/T)
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In short, the strategy is to re-invest market language with broader, more equitable
agendas, to change what it means to do academic work in a market economy. Inevitably,
this is not a return to the ‘purity’ of previous times, but nor does it constitute acceptance
of narrow market values.
Conclusion
There are, as Tight (1998, p. 259) notes, ‘hierarchies of participation’ that are ingrained
in ‘learning’ organisations; forms of social control that dictate to academics how and
whether they are to participate in determinations of what constitutes academic work and
university life. Given these hierarchies, some might think that there is, in effect, not much
difference between those on the outside looking in and others on the inside who are
constrained by its rules of organisation. As one interviewee put it, such critics are not
enamoured by the ‘Lyndon Johnson philosophy [that] you’re better off inside the tent
pissing out than outside the tent pissing in’ (AD1/S). In this article, however, we have
attempted to argue that a particular stance, critical or otherwise, is ineffective without
also accounting for one’s position in a field. In short, position and stance are ‘two
translations of the same sentence’ (Spinoza, cited in Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992,
p. 105).
In his keynote address to a recent Australian Association for Research in Education
conference in Sydney, in 2000, Ian Lowe illustrated this most clearly and in a way that
resonates with the strategy envisaged here. In his analogy, the sails of a sailboat do not
dictate that it must run in front of the wind or that where the wind is blowing is the only
direction in which the yacht can go. Rather, a clever sailor can set the sails in such a way
as to use the wind to travel in any direction he/she chooses. In the same vein, the
congenitally failing nature of panoptic techniques employed within Australian higher
education institutions, electronically mediated or otherwise, can be taken advantage of by
academics to re-direct the flow of disciplinary power and open pathways of resistance.
As illustrated in this paper, the precariousness of surveillance networks in educational
institution can actually serve to facilitate the strategic appropriation and performance of
informal and formal positions, in tandem with a critical stance. It seems to us that that
is the possibility and the challenge academics in Australian higher education must now
grasp: to set the sails so as to ride the winds of the market in ways that enhance the very
best of academic work and university life.
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